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PALLIATIVE CARE IN THE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OR CRIMINAL ACT?
STEPHEN ARONS*

INTRODUCTION

We live in increasingly polarized times, in which science, pro
fessional expertise, pragmatism, common sense, and even human
empathy are more and more becoming the acceptable collateral
damage of the culture wars. The provision of healthcare-and the
legal and policy contexts in which it is available-has not been im
mune from this corrosive process. Where once there was a rough
hewn but functional consensus governing the individual's right to
make private decisions about his or her own medical care, we now
have often intemperate and ill-informed public struggle. In this
new world of blind certainty, it is all too common to see family
members, patients, physicians, and other healthcare workers pitted
against each other, and to find that the most complex, difficult, and
intimate family and individual decisions about the dying process are
being transformed into grist for the political and ideological mills.
For over a quarter of a century, a general consensus has existed
among physicians, healthcare experts, and biomedical ethicists that
competent patients have the right to refuse unwanted medical care,
even life-sustaining care, and to secure their autonomy in these
matters through advance directives that become effective upon the
loss of legal competence. 1 Much of today's relevant healthcare law
* Stephen Arons, J.D., Harvard University, 1969, is Professor of Legal Studies at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. In the extended period of thinking through,
researching, drafting, and editing this article, the author wishes to acknowledge the in
valuable assistance of Barbara Noah, Barbara Morgan, Brynn Rovito, Lew Cohen,
Kathryn Tucker, Zita Lazzarini, my colleagues on the End of Life Care Certificate Pro
gram faculty at the Smith College School for Social Work, my colleagues in the Legal
Studies Department, and Maggie Solis and the rest of the able editors of the Western
New England Law Review.
1. See, e.g., PAUL ApPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Alan Meisel, Legal Aspects of End-of-Life Decision Mak
ing, in END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS: A PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE (Maurice D. Steinberg
& Stuart J. Younger eds., 1998); Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening Death Without Vio
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is based on and has reinforced this consensus. At the heart of the
consensus is the principle of individual autonomy-the idea that an
individual has the right to make decisions about his or her own
medical care, with all that implies about one's own sense of self,
one's values and family relationships, and one's beliefs about the
meaning of life and death.
The provision of palliative care to the terminally ill-including
adequate pain management, the assistance of a physician in provid
ing relief from other forms of physical suffering that often accom
pany dying, and the privacy of the doctor-patient-family
relationship-is an essential element of this consensus about a per
son's right to make decisions about his or her medical treatment.
Palliative care is often the alternative to treatment for the termi
nally ill when such treatment is not available or has lost its efficacy.
Palliative care becomes a necessity when a patient, exercising the
right to refuse treatment or to have treatment withdrawn, decides
that even life-sustaining medical intervention is no longer desired.
The choice of palliative care is itself an expression of the autonomy
principle in medicine. Without the availability of palliative care,
end-of-life choices for many of us and our families can become not
simply difficult and heart-wrenching, but impossibly cruel. This re
ality raises the question: what might the content of a right to pallia
tive care be, and by what process might such a right be defined as a
matter of law, medicine, and ethics?2
laling Legal and Moral Prohibitions, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 407 (2006); Lawrence O.
Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution and the Dying Process: The Case of Theresa Marie Schi·
avo, 293 JAMA 2403 (2005) [hereinafter Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution and the Dying
Process]; Richard S. Kay, Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in American Law,
54 AM. J. COMPo L. 693,697-98 (2006).
2. Work has already been done that suggests some content and questions about
the meaning of palliative care and about what a right to it might include. At bottom,
palliative care is a medical concept and should be defined by medical standards. A
legislatively created right to palliative care would largely be a matter of policy based
upon standard medical practice. But the over-arching issue in defining the ambit of a
right to palliative care is a constitutional one-how much of the content of palliative
care is a matter of individual liberty and must therefore be left to individuals to deter
mine in consultation with their physicians and without undue burdens imposed by the
state? Access for the terminally ill to a doctor's assistance in easing the dying process
involves a whole range of palliative care practices that physicians routinely provide to
patients who have refused medical treatment or who have had life-sustaining interven
tions such as artificial respiration or food and hydration withdrawn. Professor Burt's
analysis of Glucksberg includes in the concept of palliative care the alleviation of pain
and "other physical symptoms of people facing death." See infra note 79 and accompa
nying text. Several of the Justices in Glucksberg observed that the provision of pain
relief to the terminally ill could be a necessary part of palliative care even when such
medication hastens an inevitable death. See infra notes 88 & 118 and accompanying
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The right to refuse treatment and the availability of palliative
care are inextricably intertwined. The attempt to think about one
without thinking about the other is a formula for making bad law
and bad policy, and for increasing human suffering. But the con
sensus that supports the right to make these intertwined decisions
about our own medical care is now threatened. A number of doc
tors and nurses have been subjected to criminal accusations, mal
practice suits, or investigation by medical or nursing boards for
providing palliative care or for following a patient's expressed
wishes to terminate unwanted life-sustaining or death-prolonging
treatment. 3 The Attorney General of the United States sought to
text. When pain management involves the risk of hastening death-the rule of double
effect-there is debate about its role in palliative care. That debate may encompass the
practice of terminal sedation as part of palliative care. See infra notes 78 & 87 and
accompanying text.
The Quill case suggests another issue in defining palliative care. Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793 (1997). In Quill, the plaintiff and other physicians in New York claimed
that terminally ill patients not on life support should have physician assistance available
to them just as terminally ill patients who are on life support have it available to them in
eaSing and hastening their deaths. The Court refused to accept that equal-protection
argument, calling the former physician-assisted suicide and the latter refusal of medical
treatment; but this aspect of the medical and ethical issue of what constitutes palliative
care is not necessarily resolved by the Court's distinctions in Quill. A number of other
end-of-life palliative care practices may be more easily accepted. See Cantor, supra
note 1. Palliative-care physicians have also provided some guidelines for what consti
tutes adequate palliative care. See, e.g., NAT'L CONSENSUS PROJECf FOR QUALITY
PALLIATIVE CARE, CLINICAL PRACfICE GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY PALLIATIVE CARE
(2004), available at http://www.nationalconsensusproject.org/guideline.pdf.
Social workers, often the meditative force in family and healthcare decision-mak
ing at the end of life, have considerable experience and wisdom to impart about pallia
tive care. See LIVING WITH DYING (Joan Berzoff & Phyllis R. Silverman eds., 2004). A
number of other physician and social work organizations, ethicists, advocacy groups,
legal cases, and public controversies can be read as indicating what the content of a
right to palliative care-whether created judicially or legislatively-might contain. See,
e.g., infra Part IV (discussing the four aspects of the attack on palliative care and on the
right to refuse treatment). For a discussion of end-of-life care in general, see generally
HASTINGS CTR., IMPROVING END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT BEEN SO DIFFICULT?
(Bruce Jennings et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.mywhatever.com/cifwriter/
content/3/files/hastings_improvin~eoI3are.pdf. Perhaps the most complete and useful
answer to the question of what the content of a right to palliative care should include is
contained in the answer to the question of what process should be employed to study,
construct, and promote such a right. One of the purposes of this Article is to suggest
that a multi-disciplinary, well organized, and urgent project be mounted to bring
medicine, ethics, and law together in constructing a right to palliative care that would
address the real needs of all of us. See infra Conclusion.
3. The term usually used is "life-sustaining" treatment; in many circumstances,
treatment that sustains life is a prelude to the saving of life. But in many other cases,
the growth of advanced medical technology has made that term inaccurate, for real
treatment may be unavailing and advanced technology may simply prolong a painful
and unavoidable death. I have added the term "death-prolonging" treatment in order
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upend Oregon's Death with Dignity Act by issuing an order that
would have exposed every physician in the nation to the chilling
possibility of a Drug Enforcement Administration hearing about
the physician's intent in prescribing Schedule II Controlled Sub
stances Act (CSA) drugs for pain relief. 4 The U.S. Congress and
many individual state legislatures are presently considering legisla
tion that would have the effect of chilling the practice of palliative
care medicine, crimping the use of advance directives, and under
mining the autonomy principle in medical care for millions of
Americans. Even the principle of individual autonomy itself-the
liberty that lies at the heart of constitutional democracy in
America-is being deconstructed as part of efforts to promote be
neficent paternalism or to advance concepts of the meaning of life
held by various religious or interest groups. Perhaps the most dis
turbing example of this phenomenon is a section of the 2005 report
of the President's Council on Bioethics, which claims that because
illness often deprives patients of autonomy near the end of life,
medical decisions should be made by families and physicians rather
than by advance directives created when a patient is autonomous. S
This Article examines the current legal status of the right of
terminally ill and other patients to refuse unwanted medical treat
ment and to secure adequate palliative care. It discusses several
legal, political, and cultural attacks on the availability of palliative
care, on the principle of autonomy in advance directives, and on the
right to refuse treatment. It observes that the practice of medicine
and the relationships among doctors, patients, and families are in
creasingly politicized by these attacks. It also considers the possi
bility that a right to palliative care might be found in the
Constitution or be created by state legislatures. Finally, the Article
concludes that the legal status of these rights is more tenuous than
is generally assumed and that we are in the midst of a broad effort
to de-legitimize some of the most basic assumptions that Americans
hold about their medical care. Tenuous liberty rights and an active
cultural and political struggle have created a polarizing socio-Iegal
flux. The strange possibility therefore exists that, in the United
States, depending on the outcome of this struggle, the refusal of
unwanted medical treatment and the provision of adequate pallia
to acknowledge the reality that confronts many such terminally ill people and their
families.
4. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (In
terpretive Rule, Nov. 9,2001).
5. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
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tive care to the terminally ill in the future could be regarded either
as matters of individual right or as the commission of criminal acts.
A central theme of this Article is that only the former is acceptable
in a humane democracy, and that the current conditions of law, cul
ture, and medicine create not only the opportunity but also the
need to define a right to palliative care.
Much of what follows concerns the right to refuse treatment,
on the assumption that refusing or withdrawing treatment is often a
necessary part of, or precursor to, palliative care. Part I uses the
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health 6 case to present the per
sonal, cultural, and political context of a struggle over the right to
refuse medical treatment. Part II discusses the legal and constitu
tional status of the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, also
through an analysis of the Cruzan case. Part III examines the right
to refuse treatment in the context of providing palliative care for
the terminally ill; or for those whose illnesses or conditions will
cause their deaths if they decline medical treatment. It moves from
the realities and legal doctrine of Cruzan to the discussion of end
of-life issues in Washington v. Glucksberg 7 and Vacco v. Quill. s
Part IV describes and evaluates some of the main legal and policy
actions that threaten the quarter-century consensus about the ap
propriateness of an individual controlling his or her medical treat
ment. The Conclusion suggests that the future of a thoughtful,
effective, and ethical set of policies about the right to refuse treat
ment and the provision of palliative care for the terminally ill and
others depends upon backing away from the overbearing self-right
eousness of the culture wars and acknowledging that end-of-life de
cisions touch upon the most basic and intimate views of life and
death in a diverse nation. The Conclusion also urges that we bring
to bear upon the task of guaranteeing adequate palliative care as a
matter of right, the already considerable resources of law, medicine,
ethics, and our individual experiences with this unfortunately com
mon dilemma.
I.

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT: THE
CONTEXT OF THE CRUZAN CASE

The right to refuse medical treatment, even life-sustaining
medical treatment, has been a fact of legal life for over seventy-five
6.
7.
8.

Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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years. At its inception in 1914, in Justice Cardozo's opinion in the
case of Schloendorftv. Society of New York Hospital,9 an individual
was entitled to be free of unwanted and unconsented touching by a
physician under the law of battery. Growing out of an intentional
tort, the right to refuse medical treatment included the requirement
that a patient give his or her informed consent to a medical proce
dure. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the right to re
fuse medical treatment also found a basis in the United States
Constitution, with courts referring to either a privacy interest or a
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.lO At the core of both common law and constitutional con
ceptions of the right has been the principle of individual autonomy.
Justice Cardozo put it this way: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body."ll Seventy-six years later, in the Cruzan case, Justice
O'Connor filled out the concept of autonomy using the language of
constitutional liberty:
The State's imposition of medical treatment on an unwilling com
petent adult necessarily involves some form of restraint and in
trusion. A seriously ill or dying patient whose wishes are not
honored may feel a captive of the machinery required for life
sustaining measures or other medical interventions. Such forced
treatment may burden that individual's liberty interests as much
as any state coercion. 12

Justice Stevens went still further in his dissent in the same case:
"Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our
own mortality are undoubtedly 'so rooted in the traditions and con
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'''13
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health 14 is the centerpiece
in the development of a constitutional basis for the right to refuse
medical treatment. The case magnified both the difficulty and the
significance of the constitutional ruling because Nancy Cruzan, the
patient involved, was in a persistent vegetative state and thus una
9. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
10. For a brief history of the growth and legal variations of the right to refuse
treatment, see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270-80.
11. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934».
14. Id.
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ble to contemporaneously communicate a decision about her medi
cal treatment. A discussion of the Cruzan ruling and its context is
central to appreciating the tenuous legal status of the right to refuse
life-saving medical treatment. IS The depth and complexity of the
Cruzan family's tragedy can only be hinted at here, but it is an im
portant part of assessing the meaning of the constitutional doctrine
in the case and the intensity of those who oppose the current con
sensus about the right to refuse medical treatment. 16
Twenty-six year-old Nancy Cruzan was in a one-car automobile
accident in early 1983, and her brain suffered twelve to fourteen
minutes of oxygen deprivation before she could be resuscitated by
paramedics. After nearly a month in a coma with virtually no sign
of improvement, Nancy's father, Joe, and her husband, Paul Davis,
signed a consent form to have a gastrostomy tube (for feeding and
hydration) inserted surgically in Nancy's stomach in order to make
her treatment and care easier.17 No Cruzan family member could
have known that this was a decision that would result in seven years
of litigation. As Joe Cruzan said later, "I had no idea I was signing
away anybody's rights that day. I would have signed anything. We
were just waiting for Nancy to wake Up."18
Many months of medical interventions and family attention
failed to yield any sustained improvement in her condition. Nancy
eventually was given a diagnosis of "persistent vegetative state"
(PVS).1 9 She was permanently unconscious-unaware, unrespon
sive, unable to communicate, and deprived of any possibility of
even the slightest recovery. Her very limited biological existence
was sustained-or her dying was prolonged-by the artificial feed
ing and hydration tube inserted in her abdomen, and by constant
care from a loving family and a devoted staff at a state-supported
medical facility in Missouri. She was not terminally ill, and in fact
her metabolic existence could have been maintained for as many as
15. As Justice Stevens put it, "Nancy Cruzan's liberty to be free from medical
treatment must be understood in light of the facts and circumstances particular to her."
Id. at 331.
16. A comprehensive, engaging, and unbiased account of these events and of the
accompanying litigation can be found in William H. Colby's excellent book, Long
Goodbye: The Deaths of Nancy Cruzan. WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE
DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002).
17. Id. at 17-22.
18. Id. at 22.
19. Doctors found that Nancy had been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS)
since January 11, 1983. There was some debate about the actual date of the onset of the
PVS, but just before the probate court hearing on removal of the feeding tube, no fewer
than five doctors agreed that the PVS was long-standing and permanent. See id. at 100.
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thirty years. Since she was in a state medical facility, the enormous
expense of maintaining her in a PVS was born by the State of
Missouri.
Nancy Cruzan had had several informal conversations with
friends that indicated that she would not want to be kept "alive"
under circumstances such as those associated with being in a vege
tative state, but she had no living will and had not appointed a
healthcare proxy.20 By the fall of 1986, three and one-half years
after the accident, and after the exhaustion of every medical option
conceivable, Nancy Cruzan's parents (by then her legal guardians)
reached the agonizing decision that her feeding and hydration tube
should be removed and that she should be allowed to die peacefully
in accordance with what the family understood to have been her
expressed wishes. But the hospital, a state institution, would not
agree unless so ordered by a court. In July 1988, a probate court
found that there was sufficient evidence of Nancy's intent to war
rant the removal of the feeding tube. 21
At that point, the media attention, which had already been in
tense and intimidating to the family, became overwhelming. The
question of how long Nancy Cruzan's death and the anguish of her
family would be prolonged became a cultural and political cause
celi'~bre as well as a significant constitutional contest. What had
once been a most private, and in some senses, isolated family crisis,
in which no person would wish to have to participate, had turned
into a nationwide contest of seemingly boundless moral, political,
cultural, religious, legal, and emotional significance in which indi
20. Missouri law does not permit a living will to include the withdrawal of artifi
cial feeding and hydration even from a person in a PVS. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3)
(2006). This led Missouri Supreme Court Judge Welliver, in his dissent in Cruzan v.
Harmon, to write,
Yes, we Missourians can sign an instrument directing the withholding or
withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, but, after the Missouri amend
ments, "death-prolonging procedure" does not include: (1) the "administra
tion of medication," (2) "the performance of medical procedure [sic] deemed
necessary to provide comfort, care or to alleviate pain" (3) "the performance
of any procedure to provide nutrition," or (4) "the performance of any proce
dure to provide ... hydration." If we cannot authorize withdrawing or with
holding "medication," "nutrition" or "hydration," then what can we authorize
to be withheld in Missouri? The Missouri Living Will Act is a fraud on Mis
sourians who believe we have been given a right to execute a living will, and to
die naturally, respectably, and in peace.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 442 (Mo. 1988) (Welliver, J., dissenting), affd,
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270-80 (1990).
21. A history of the case, from the trial court up to the Missouri Supreme Court,
can be found in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408.
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viduals, interest groups, politicians, religious figures, and pundits of
every stripe seemed to feel entitled to characterize the Cruzan fam
ily's motives and to control their actions. 22
The probate court's decision was appealed by the State of Mis
souri, whose Attorney General was William Webster and whose
Governor was John Ashcroft. It would not be an exaggeration to
note that Nancy Cruzan's life was once again taken from her. 23 The
Missouri Supreme Court overturned the probate court, ruling, in
effect, that clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's inten
tions, expressed at the time when she was legally competent, was
not presented by the family's witnesses. 24 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed this decision in a five to four ruling in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the majority that "for purposes of this case, we
assume that the United States Constitution would grant a compe
tent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hy
dration and nutrition."25 Still, the Court held that Missouri was
constitutionally entitled to impose a rule of decision requiring clear
and convincing evidence in such cases, thus sending the Cruzan
family back to the local probate court to retry the issue of Nancy
Cruzan's wishes. It had been seven and one-half years since an au
tomobile accident had put Nancy Cruzan in a permanent vegetative
state and the rest of the Cruzan family in a state of perpetual
grieving.
A new hearing was held using the required clear-and-convinc
ing-evidence standard and, with very little new evidence, the court
once again determined, on December 14, 1990, that it would have
been Nancy Cruzan's wish not to be maintained in a progressively
worsening PVS by continuing medical treatment that offered abso
22. The Cruzan case bears similarities to the more recent case of Theresa Schiavo
in the sense that an ideological and cultural public conflict seemed to supersede the
private realities and values of the families; but the Cruzan case carries a heavier weight
in constitutional doctrine on the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah,
Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 107 (2004). For medical and social work perspectives, as well as legal and policy
commentary, see Special Issue, The Lessons o/the Terri Schiavo Case, 4 PALLIATIVE &
SUPPORTIVE CARE 411 (2006). See also Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution and the Dying
Process, supra note 1.
23. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stevens commented
on the state's motives this way: "The opposition of life and liberty in this case are thus
not the result of Nancy Cruzan's tragic accident, but are instead the artificial conse
quence of Missouri's effort and this Court's willingness, to abstract Nancy Cruzan's life
from Nancy Cruzan's person." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
25. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
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lutely no hope of any improvement in her condition. The State of
Missouri did not appeal, and Nancy Cruzan's artificial feeding and
hydration was withdrawn by court order that day.26 She finished
dying on December 26, 1990, but not before some of the many
protestors who had gathered outside the medical facility sought to
break in on the Cruzans' bedside vigil and "rescue" Nancy with
cups of water,27 Other protestors had circulated flyers describing
Nancy as "smiling at amusing stories, weeping after visitors had left,
'eating bananas, potatoes, and link sausages, and drinking juice' af
ter her accident."28 Operation Rescue protestors, taking a page
from their campaign against reproductive freedoms, had accused
the Cruzans of being murderers. 29 The conduct of the protestors
prompted one judge to warn, in dismissing an Operation Rescue
petition to extend the Cruzan family's agony, that "further filings
could be [considered] an abuse of process. "30
One other matter completes the context of the doctrinal de
bate found in the Cruzan opinions. The Cruzan family's tragedy
began with Nancy's accident and her rapid decline into unrecover
able unconsciousness, but it was compounded by the fact that this
loving family had to contend daily with a struggle magnified by the
media, delayed by seemingly endless litigation, and seized upon by
interest groups whose political goals or religious convictions must
have seemed to those groups important enough to justify prolong
ing not only Nancy's biological existence, but also the Cruzan fam
ily's emotional and spiritual anguish. Under these conditions,
Nancy's father Joe, though he ultimately prevailed in court, could
hardly have considered the fruits of his long struggle on Nancy's
behalf to be a win. More than five years after the world of politics
26. COLBY, supra note 16, at 357-66.
27. [d. at 373.
28. [d. at 368; see id. at 367-80 (describing the protests at the hospital). The ab
stract issue had become so intense that the protestors completely lost any sense of the
reality of the case and any human understanding of the Cruzan family's ordeal. Colby
reports that one judge became so exhausted by the protestors' attempts to exploit the
judiciary that he interrupted one protestor's plea by saying, "'I just despise people like
you' ... 'Get out of here.'" [d. at 380.
29. Many of the protestors were from outside of Missouri and plainly veterans of
campaigns against reproductive freedom. The intensity of these protestors and the sub
stance of their arguments convey a sense in Colby's book that much more was at stake
for them, and for the state's position in the litigation, than Nancy Cruzan's medical
treatment or even the general principle of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. It was, perhaps, a single battle in a larger legal and cultural war. See gener
ally id. at 368-80.
30. [d. at 380.
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and media had lost most of its interest in the meaning of this trag
edy, Joe Cruzan-having achieved a victory that secured an irre
trievable loss and having been exhausted by an emotional struggle
with what must have seemed like a cold and unforgiving world of
culture warriors-committed suicide. 31 His suicide is perhaps the
most poignant measure of the toll that polarizing politics can take
on those individuals and families who are forced by circumstances
to contend with the complex spiritual and physical realities-and
the ambivalent emotions-that lie at the heart of a family tragedy
like the Cruzans'.
II.

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT: LEGAL
DOCTRINE IN THE CRUZAN CASE

A careful, contextual reading of the five opinions in the U.S.
Supreme Court's five to four decision in Cruzan is both hopeful
and discouraging for anyone interested in preserving the legal, med
ical, and ethical consensus about the right to refuse unwanted medi
cal treatment. In fact, so varied are the contextual and doctrinal
bases of these opinions-and so pointed the disagreements among
the Justices-that on the whole, Cruzan adds more ambiguity than
clarity to the law in this area. The two main problems with the
decision in Cruzan are discussed below.
A.

A Tentative Statement of a Tenuous and Poorly Described
Right

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court,
concluding that there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids
Missouri from adopting a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
for those seeking to show that a patient in a PVS would want artifi
cial feeding and hydration either withheld or withdrawn. In reach
ing this conclusion, the Court explored the putative constitutional
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but was willing to go
no further than to state,
The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions....
. . . . But for purposes of this case, we assume that the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
31.

See id. at xii, 391-98.
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constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition. 32

The other basis for a right to refuse medical treatment, tort
law, and the requirement of informed consent, was explored at
length by the Court, thereby demonstrating how much a part of
American life and medicine that right has been for over seventy
five years. But the crucial question put at issue by the probate
court's holding in Cruzan and by the Missouri Supreme Court's re
versal of that holding, was whether a constitutional basis for pro
tecting this individual right, either as a matter of privacy or liberty,
could be found. Chief Justice Rehnquist's exploration of the
lengthy history of tort law on the subject, and his shorter history of
state court rulings on the constitutional basis of the right, shows a
wide variety of differing approaches and considerable disagreement
and uncertainty about how to understand and approach the issue of
the right to refuse medical treatment. In view of this, the Court's
very tentative statement on the matter is not particularly helpful or
encouragmg.
The weakness of the Court's statement of the liberty right is
put in bold relief by Justice Brennan's dissent, in which he com
mented that the Court refused to discuss "either the measure of
that liberty interest or its application," and concluded from his own
extensive analysis that "if a competent person has a liberty interest
to be free of unwanted medical treatment ... it must be fundamen
tal. "33 Justice Brennan's discussion of the right to be free of un
wanted medical treatment in tort and in related constitutional cases
places the fundamental nature of the right in the context of all-too
common human dilemmas:

32. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278-79 (1990) (emphasis added).
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion went a bit further:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against her will bur
dens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her
own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment.
Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's was the swing vote in the
case.
33. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The question of whether the liberty at
stake here is fundamental is central; and in this case that question is made more com
plex by the fact that Nancy Cruzan was not legally competent to exercise the right
fundamental or not-herself. See id. at 321-26 (discussing the loss of decisional capac
ity and the clear and convincing standard of evidence).
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The right to be free from medical attention without consent,
to determine what shall be done with one's own body, is deeply
rooted in this Nation's traditions ....
The right to be free from unwanted medical attention is a
right to evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its possi
ble consequences according to one's own values and to make a
personal decision whether to subject oneself to the intrusion....
. . . . Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the
thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. ... "In
certain, thankfully rare, circumstances the burden of maintaining
the corporeal existence degrades the very humanity it was meant
to serve."34
Had the Court taken the measure of the liberty interest at
stake and found it to have been a fundamental one, not only would
the state's burden in justifying its attempt to infringe upon Nancy
Cruzan's liberty have been considerably greater, but the value of
Cruzan as precedent would also have been greater.
Justice Brennan's understanding of the right to refuse life-sus
taining treatment in general-and of what was at stake for the
Cruzans and for the thousands of other families with loved ones in a
PVS-highlights the paleness of Chief Justice Rehnquist's under
standing of these same matters. For example, the majority opinion
claimed that "[a]n erroneous decision not to terminate [Nancy
Cruzan's medical treatment] results in a maintenance of the status
quo [and suggests that medical or evidentiary discoveries] create
the potential that a wrong decision [not to terminate] will eventu
ally be corrected or its impact mitigated. "35 Justice Brennan saw a
dimension that reflects the actual experience of families faced with
complex and heart-wrenching decisions about artificial life support.
But, from the point of view of the patient, an erroneous de
cision in either direction is irrevocable. . . . An erroneous deci
sion not to terminate life support ... robs a patient of the very
qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treat
ment. His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's
34. Id. at 305-11 (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626,
635-36 (Mass. 1986». The fact that end-of-life treatment issues have become more dif
ficult and more common with the extraordinary rise of medical technology in the past
half century does not lessen the historical importance of these aspects of individual
liberty.
35. Id. at 283 (majority opinion).
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suffering is protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes
more and more distorted. 36

Justice Stevens put the difference between the majority's and
dissent's understandings of the rights and realities of the case in still
bolder relief. In describing the nature of the individual liberty at
stake, Justice Stevens reasoned that just as the physical aspects of
life are protected by individual liberty, "so too the constitutional
protection for the human body is surely inseparable from concern
for the mind and spirit that dwell therein. "37 He noted as well that
the right to refuse treatment "presupposes no abandonment of the
desire for life. Nor is it reducible to a protection against batteries
undertaken in the name of treatment, or to a guarantee against the
infliction of bodily discomfort. "38 After noting that the Court was
willing to ignore Nancy Cruzan's best interests and to minimize im
portant aspects of her liberty interest, Justice Stevens observed that
"[t]he Court's willingness to find a waiver of this constitutional right
reveals a distressing misunderstanding of the importance of individ
ual liberty. "39
The strength of the Court's statement about the liberty interest
at stake in refusing unwanted medical treatment was thrown into
further doubt by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. Justice Scalia's
opinion considered any refusal of life-sustaining (or death-prolong
ing) medical treatment to be an act of attempted suicide; and he
claimed that "American law has always accorded the State the
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide
by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve
one's own life."40 Justice Scalia supported the requirement of clear
36. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went still further in exam
ining the meaning of Cruzan's liberty interest.
Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in being remembered for how she
lived rather than how she died, the damage done to those memories by the
prolongation of her death is irreversible. Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an in
terest in the cessation of any pain, the continuation of her pain is irreversible.
Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in a closure to her life consistent with
her own beliefs rather than those of the Missouri legislature, the State's impo
sition of its contrary view is irreversible. To deny the importance of these
consequences is in effect to deny that Nancy Cruzan has interests at all, and
thereby to deny her personhood in the name of preserving the sanctity of her
life.
Id. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. !d. at 339.
40. Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and convincing evidence in Cruzan, but would have preferred to
have left the whole controversy to decision by a majority of Mis
souri voters: "[E]ven when it is demonstrated by clear and convinc
ing evidence that a patient no longer wishes certain measures to be
taken to preserve his or her life, it is up to the citizens of Missouri
to decide, through their elected representatives, whether that wish
will be honored. "41
In view of this opinion, Justice Scalia's concurrence with the
Court's assumption of the existence of a liberty interest in Cruzan
seems disingenuous at best, and the legal value of the Court's as
sumption must be discounted considerably because of it. In his dis
sent, Justice Stevens suggested that because of the spiritual
dimension to decisions such as those made by the Cruzan family,
religious freedoms are implicated: "[N]ot much may be said with
confidence about death unless it is said from faith, and that alone is
reason enough to protect the freedom to conform choices about
death to individual conscience. . .. Our ethical tradition has long
regarded an appreciation of mortality as essential to understanding
life's significance."42 But Justice Scalia would have none of it: "This
is a view that some societies have held, and that our States are free
to adopt if they wish. But it is not a view imposed by our constitu
tional traditions, in which the power of the State to prohibit suicide
is unquestionable. "43
Some of these weaknesses in the Court's statement about the
right to refuse medical treatment also arise because of differences
in the ways in which the question before the Court is described.
The Chief Justice stated that Cruzan was "the first case ... squarely
present[ing the question of] whether the Constitution grants what is
in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die.' "44 This may
41. Id. (emphasis added). Although Justice Scalia couches this argument in terms
of restraining activist judges, it is in fact an argument that there is no constitutional (as
opposed to common law) right of individuals to be free of unwanted, life-sustaining
medical treatment. This suggests that the state's power over what many Americans and
much of jurisprudence consider fundamental to constitutional democracy is nearly un
limited. For a similar view about the power of political majorities to control family and
individual life, see Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
42. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring). This statement is especially problematic for
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment-or perhaps any treatment-because Jus
tice Scalia considers such decisions to be attempted suicide. For a discussion of why the
suicide formulation is "too simplistic," see Cantor, supra note 1, at 409.
44. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. This formulation may have been useful rhetorically
to the Chief Justice in Cruzan, but it would become problematic for him in the physi

324

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:309

have been useful in arousing opposition to the claimed right. The
majority opinion had also described the question as "whether
Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which
would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from her. "45 This may have been useful in casting the focus of the
issue away from Nancy Cruzan's decision and onto the idea that the
state would be causing her death by allowing her treatment to be
stopped. The Court also put the question in terms of Missouri's
rule of decision,46 making it seem like a merely procedural question
rather than one of substantive rights. Justice Brennan's dissent also
makes use of a Justice's prerogative to state the question in a way
that partially answers itself to his or her own liking. "The question
before this Court is a relatively narrow one: whether the Due Pro
cess Clause allows Missouri to require a now-incompetent patient
in an irreversible PVS to remain on life support absent rigorously
clear and convincing evidence that avoiding the treatment repre
sents the patient's prior, express choice."47
But the most telling formulation of the question in Cruzan, the
one that acknowledges and is based upon the actual context of the
case and of the Cruzan family's dilemma, is provided by Justice
Stevens:
If Nancy Cruzan has no interest in continued treatment, and if
she has a liberty interest in being free from unwanted treatment,
and if the cessation of treatment would have no adverse impact
on third parties, and if no reason exists to doubt the good faith of
Nancy's parents, then what possible basis could the State have
for insisting upon continued medical treatment?48

cian-assisted suicide case, Washington v. Glucksberg, where he claimed that the Cruzan
Court had been more specific and careful in its use of words. See Washington v. Gluck
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
46. /d. at 277.
47. /d. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The question of why Missouri Attorney
General William L. Webster and Governor John Ashcroft intervened in the first
place-of what the state's interests really were-is made more pointed when one re
flects on the second probate court's finding after the Supreme Court's ruling. Using
virtually the same evidence and the required clear and convincing standard, the judge
ruled again that Nancy Cruzan would have wanted treatment terminated and ordered it
done. COLBY, supra note 16, at 359-62. After that second ruling, there was no appeal
ordered by Webster or Ashcroft. Id. at 365-66. The state's interest had apparently been
satisfied by the Court's right-to-life logic, not by the actual outcome of the case.
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Misstating the State's Interests and Accepting its Imbalanced
Procedure

With even a grudging declaration that there is an individual
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment, the balancing of a
state's legitimate interest in overcoming that right was central to the
ruling in Cruzan. The Court began its analysis with a distillation of
state interests in right-to-refuse-treatment cases at the state level,
including "the preservation of life, the protection of the interests of
innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the mainte
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession."49 The
Court concluded that "Missouri relie[d] on its interest in the protec
tion and preservation of human life, [to justify imposing a clear and
convincing evidence standard] and [that] there can be no gainsaying
this interest. "50 The Court then made two arguments central to its
conclusion that the state's interest in the protection and preserva
tion of life was more than strong enough to justify the burden that
Missouri placed upon the exercise of Nancy Cruzan's liberty
interest.
First, the Court stated that the real question was one of accu
racy of decision-of whether there was sufficient evidence to en
sure that Nancy Cruzan's wishes actually were that her medical
treatment should be terminated if she were in a PVS.51 Here, the
Court claimed that the clear and convincing evidence standard that
it approved is merely a procedural safeguard designed to provide
assurance of the accuracy of any finding about Cruzan's wishes.
Second, the Court reasoned that "a State may properly decline to
make judgments about the 'quality' of life that any particular indi
vidual may enjoy"52 by acting to preserve metabolic existence no
matter what the circumstances. There are weaknesses in the rea
soning of each of these arguments for Cruzan's elevating the consti
tutional status of the state's interest in protecting and preserving
life. As a result, the case becomes an exemplar of how easily the
49. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
50. Id. at 280.
51. See id. at 281. This question is raised by the fact that Ms. Cruzan was medi
cally and legally incompetent to assert her own rights or to express her own wishes
because she had been in a PVS for years after her auto accident. Id. at 266. Since she
did not have an advance directive (i.e., a living will or healthcare proxy), it became
necessary for her family to try to piece together what she did say and what she would
have wished about her medical treatment. The State joined the struggle over her fate
when her parents and co-guardians informed the state hospital director of their decision
and he refused to comply without a court order. COLBY, supra note 16, at 49-50.
52. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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tenuous constitutional right to refuse medical treatment can be
trumped by an artificially enhanced state interest in protecting life.
As to the first argument, the majority opinion in Cruzan stated
that Missouri recognized the right of a surrogate to terminate artifi
cial feeding and nutrition under certain circumstances, but "it has
established a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the
patient while competent."53 But Justice Brennan's dissent pointed
out that this is not a substantively neutral procedural protection,
but a "markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden" upon Nancy
Cruzan's fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. 54 The
clear and convincing evidence standard was applied to the question
of whether Cruzan would want the life support removed, but not to
the question of whether she would want the life support contin
ued. 55 Because of this imbalance, an ostensibly neutral procedural
requirement had the foreseeable effect of creating a presumption
that the state's definition of life would prevail.
The Court sought to bolster its argument about the rule of de
cision by claiming that an erroneous decision to terminate life sup
port is irrevocable, while an erroneous decision not to terminate life
support does no real harm to the patient or her liberty interest. 56
The weakness in this argument is a reflection of the Chief Justice's
apparent unwillingness to discuss the nature and scope of Cruzan's
liberty interest, as Justice Brennan pointed out. 57 The Court also
argued that a rule of decision, whether requiring clear and convinc
ing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was created to
"'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in ... a particular type of adjudica
tion,' "58 and to distribute the risk of error in the decision accord
ingly. Again, Justice Brennan exposed the flaw in the argument:
In the cases cited by the majority, the imbalance imposed by
a heightened evidentiary standard was not only acceptable but
53. [d. at 280.
54. [d. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. [d.
56. /d. at 283 (majority opinion).
57. See supra notes 33-34, 36 and accompanying text.
58. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423
(1979)). Though the mere mention of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may seem ex
treme in the context of the Cruzan case, it has been advocated as appropriate for termi
nating life support. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the
Special Law Enacted by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 151, 164-66
(2006).
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required because the standard was deployed to protect an indi
vidual's exercise of a fundamental right, as the majority admits.
In contrast, the Missouri court imposed a clear and convincing
evidence standard as an obstacle to the exercise of a fundamental
right.59

Brennan also pointed out that there are other, more even
handed and effective protections available to minimize the risks of
an inaccurate decision about a patient's wishes. The easiest exam
ple is the guardian ad litem, whose "task is to uncover any conflicts
of interest and ensure that each party likely to have relevant evi
dence is consulted and brought forward. "60 The trial court em
ployed such a guardian, but his recommendations and findings were
ignored by the Missouri Supreme Court. 61
The U.S. Supreme Court's use of the procedural argument is
thus misleading not only in its substance, but also in its conse
quences; for it masks the fact that the Cruzan opinion simultane
ously inflates the state's interest and "evinces a disdain for Nancy
Cruzan's own right to choose,"62 without admitting that it is doing
either. Consequently, the strength of the Cruzan decision as a pro
tection for the individual right to refuse medical treatment is ren
dered even lower than might appear from reading the language of
the Court's holding. It is troublesome also that the Court's ap
proval of the imbalanced standard of proof increases the polariza
tion that is always present in an adversarial process. This
adversarial intensity is traditionally regarded as useful to achieving
truth in high-stakes cases, but it is far from clear that it will have
any such effect on the very complex, emotional, and often ambiva
lent decisions about terminating medical treatment or seeking palli
ative care. In fact, it could be argued that it is just this process that
encourages interest groups and others far removed from family
tragedies like the Cruzans' to seek to turn difficult and intensely
private family decisions into polarizing public battles in the culture
wars. The result is the politicization of the doctor/patient
relationship.
59. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 319-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). It
should also be noted that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for
example, is imposed in criminal cases in part to help rectify the extraordinary imbalance
of power between the state as prosecutor and an individual defendant. In the Cruzan
opinion, it appears that the object was to increase, rather than rectify, an imbalance of
power.
60. Id. at 318.
61. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422-24 (Mo. 1988).
62. Cruzan, 497 U,S, at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Court's second argument for the primacy of Missouri's in
terest in preserving life is no more compelling than its argument
about the rule of decision. Its statement about Missouri's refusal to
make a judgment about "quality of life" is appealing in that it reso
nates with disabled persons who are rightfully concerned that
American society and law devalue their personhood and would de
prive them of important rights if not restrained by an appropriate
legal analysis of state interests and by a better-educated public.
The Court's statement is also aimed at those who believe that state
power at all levels is excessive and is becoming a general danger to
individual liberty. But in fact the State of Missouri did adopt a par
ticular judgment about the quality of life. It decided that no matter
how painful, how divorced from awareness or responsiveness, or
how much at odds with the wishes of the person whose life it is,63
metabolic life that would cease naturally must be preserved by
medical technology-and "by force if necessary."64
Beyond the problem of the Court's somewhat disingenuous
logic-its attempt to christen Missouri's interest in preserving any
quality of life by artificial means as not a judgment about quality of
life-there is the problem of the decision's consequences. Award
ing to the state, instead of to the individual, the power to determine
what life must be preserved carries with it the constitutional possi
bility that a state could adopt another, more nefarious determina
tion setting out which lives must be preserved and which sacrificed.
Justice Stevens put it this way:
Today the State of Missouri has announced its intent to
spend several hundred thousand dollars in preserving the life of
Nancy Beth Cruzan in order to vindicate its general policy favor
ing the preservation of human life. Tomorrow, another State
equally eager to champion an interest in the "quality of life"
might favor a policy designed to ensure quick and comfortable
deaths by denying treatment to categories of marginally hopeless
cases. 65
63. That Missouri was determined to overcome even the most clear and convinc
ing statement by even a competent person wishing to refuse medical treatment under
certain circumstances can be seen from its living will statute, which cannot be used to
refuse or terminate artificial feeding and hydration for a person in a PVS. Even had
Nancy Cruzan filled out a living will making her wishes crystal clear, the State's defini
tion of quality of life would still have trumped her individual wishes. See supra note 20.
64. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 354-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The phenomenon to which Justice Ste
vens refers-patients or their families insisting upon the use of scarce medical resources
to provide what the medical profession would consider "futile" treatments for a particu
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There is also the problem of the sectarian nature of the particu
lar definition of life that is implied by Missouri's decision about the
quality of life that must be preserved by any and all means. Mis
souri has in effect adopted a particular Christian view and defini
tion of life, its meaning, and nature. To many Americans, there is
nothing wrong with this particular theological view of life, but
under the Constitution, the state is forbidden from denying to indi
viduals-indeed, does not have the power to deny to individuals
the right to determine these fundamental spiritual questions for
themselves. As Justice Stevens put it,
In short, there is no reasonable ground for believing that
Nancy Beth Cruzan has any personal interest in the perpetuation
of what the State has decided is her life. . .. [I]t would be possi
ble to hypothesize such an interest on the basis of theological or
philosophical conjecture. But even to posit such a basis for the
State's action is to condemn it. It is not within the province of
secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sec
tarian definition of life. 66

It may be argued reasonably that the majority OpInIOn in

Cruzan serves purposes opposite to many of those it claims to ad
vance. Justice Stevens asked the fundamental question about "what
possible basis" the State of Missouri could have in resisting the
lar patient-is becoming a legal issue as common as refusing medical treatment. For a
discussion of this issue, how some states are handling it, and its relationship to the
autonomy principle, see Zita Lazzarini et aI., Legal and Policy Lessons from the Schiavo
Case: Is Our Right to Choose the Medical Care We Want Seriously at Risk?, 4 PALLIA
TIVE & SUPPORTIVE CARE 1, 6-8 (2006).
66. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting». Justice Stevens
here referred to his dissent in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a case in which
the Court had accepted a Missouri legislative definition of life in the preamble to a
statute restricting abortion rights. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506
07 (1989). The strategic connection between the right to refuse medical treatment and
the right to reproductive freedom is found again two years after Cruzan, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In writing the
opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor reviewed the standards by which the weight of
a precedent like Roe v. Wade should be judged. Id. at 857 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973». Justice O'Connor's opinion that Roe should not be overruled in
cluded the following: "Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold
liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integ
rity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to man
date medical treatment or to bar its rejection." Id. Had Cruzan rejected outright the
constitutional basis of the right to refuse medical treatment, the case could have further
weakened the right to choose to have an abortion, as reaffirmed in Casey. Id.
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Cruzan family and in denying Nancy Cruzan's constitutional right
to refuse treatment. 67 He answered his own question: "The State's
unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy Cruzan's physical
existence is comprehensible only as an effort to define life's mean
ing, not as an attempt to preserve its sanctity."68 Once the Supreme
Court had accepted, or at least allowed to stand, the Missouri defi
nition of life, there would be no more reason for state officials to
bedevil the Cruzan family; and they did not do SO.69
III.

FROM CRUZAN TO GLUCKSBERG: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
TREATMENT AND THE NEED FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AT
THE END OF LIFE

On December 14, 1990, Nancy Cruzan's artificial feeding and
hydration tube was removed by order of a Missouri probate court,
almost eight years after the automobile accident that had left her in
a PVS. In the twelve days that it took her to finish dying in the
hospice wing of the hospital, she received no medication or medical
intervention. Because of the nature of her condition, she needed
no palliative care. But every year, thousands, perhaps hundreds of
thousands, of severely ill people do need palliative care as their
lives end. Those in need of palliative care are most often patients
who have decided to refuse medical treatment or to withdraw life
sustaining medical intervention.7° Medical treatment may have lost
its effectiveness, the suffering caused by the treatment or the dis
ease may have become greater than any benefit that treatment pro
vides, or a terminally ill patient may have decided for any number
of personal, spiritual, familial, or other reasons that the best course
67.

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 345. Justice Stevens also argued that "[h]owever commendable may be
the State's interest in human life, it cannot pursue that interest by appropriating Nancy
Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes." Id. at 356. But it appears to have done
just that.
69. Not only does the reasoning of the Cruzan majority render uncertain its use
fulness in the growing struggle over the individual right to refuse medical treatment, but
the highly conflicted opinions in the case also reflect and may encourage the kind of
polarizing behavior that made the Cruzans' struggle so long and painful.
70. In Justice Brennan's dissent in Cruzan, he noted that "[o]f the approximately
2 million people who die each year, 80% die in hospitals and long-term care institutions,
and perhaps 70% of those after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has been
made." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing H.L. Lipton, Do
Not-Resuscitate Decisions in a Community Hospital: Incidence, Implications and Out
comes, 256 JAMA 1164, 1168 (1986)). More recent studies confirm these proportions.
See, e.g., LAST ACTS, MEANS TO A BETTER END: A REPORT ON DYING IN AMERICA
TODAY (2002), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/meansbetterend.
pdf.
68.
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for whatever time they have remaining may lie not with medical
treatment, but with palliative care. In any of these circumstances
whether a patient is taken off life-sustaining interventions such as
respirators or artificial feeding and nutrition, refuses chemotherapy
or antibiotics to treat their condition, or simply decides to let a
medical condition take its course-the dying process may involve
severe or intractable pain, agitation, or other forms of physical dis
tress, loss of control of bodily functions, or any number of other
symptoms that can be successfully ameliorated by a physician's ac
tive provision of adequate palliative care.71
These facts of dying, especially the problem of severe pain at
the end of life, were recognized as being of possible constitutional
significance by several Justices in the 1997 companion cases of
Washington v. Glucksberg 72 and Vacca v. Quill. 73 These cases
unanimously upheld the power of a state to criminalize physician
assisted suicide, and each refused to find a fundamental individual
right to hasten one's own death. But in the process of writing six
opinions articulating the reasoning of the decisions, the Justices sug
gest that there might be situations in which a state's interference
with a terminally ill patient's ability to get adequate pain relief
would violate-or lead the Court to discover-an as-yet unarticu
lated constitutional right. To get to these comments about a central
aspect of palliative care for the terminally ill, the Justices had to
consider the meaning of Cruzan and the constitutional status of the
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.7 4
71. See LIVING WITH DYING, supra note 2. A moving and informative discussion
of the medical and humane aspects of the end of life can be found in How We Die, by
Sherwin B. Nuland. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE (Vintage Books 1995).
72. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that Washington
State's law against assisting or encouraging suicide does not violate Fourteenth Amend
ment individual liberty interests, even as applied to competent, terminally ill patients
who request physician assistance in hastening their imminent deaths).
73. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that New York's statute making
physician-assisted suicide a crime does not irrationally deprive of physician assistance in
hastening death only those terminally ill patients who are not on life support). In Quill,
the Court found no equal protection violation in a state law permitting those terminally
ill who have refused medical treatment or have had life support withdrawn to receive
active palliative care from a physician, but denying those terminally ill who are neither
on life support nor in need of life-sustaining treatment the chance to receive the active
assistance of a physician in hastening even an imminent death. Id. at 808-09.
74. The Ninth Circuit majority had used Cruzan, along with the reproductive
freedom case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, to justify its decision that Washington
State's criminalization of physician assisted suicide violated the fundamental liberty
rights of legally competent, terminally ill patients. Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
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A constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat
ment seems to be supported by the Glucksberg and Quill decisions,
at least insofar as most of the opinions in the cases suggest in one
way or another that refusing treatment is not suicide and is there
fore distinguishable from the physician-assisted suicide that the
Court rejects. But the Glucksberg and Quill opinions continue the
ambiguous status of Cruzan and seem to confirm its continuing
weakness as a protection for the right to refuse medical treatment.
In Glucksberg, for example, the Chief Justice reiterated his mini
malist statement from Cruzan that "[w]e have also assumed, and
strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the tradi
tional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment."75 He
relegated a slightly stronger statement to a footnote discussion of
the Court's view about the creation of substantive due process
rights: "[W]e concluded that the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment was so rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to
require special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."76 In
Quill, the value of Cruzan as a constitutional precedent was re
duced still further by describing it as primarily grounded in tort law:
"[O]ur assumption of a right to refuse treatment was grounded not,
as the Court of Appeals supposed, on the proposition that patients
have a general and abstract 'right to hasten death,' but on well
established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from
unwanted touching."77
In spite of minimizing a constitutional grounding for the right
to refuse treatment, there is significant discussion of the real needs
of terminally ill patients to have access to pain relief and perhaps to
other forms of palliative care. The suggestion that five Justices in
1997 were as sympathetic to a putative right to palliative care as
they were opposed to finding a right to a physician's assistance in
hastening even an imminent death was raised by Professor Robert
Burt in the New England Journal of Medicine four months after the
Glucksberg and Quill decisions were handed down. 78 Professor
79 F.3d 790, 813-16 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309
(1994).
75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
76. Id. at 721 n.17.
77. Quill, 521 U.S. at 807 (citation omitted) (quoting Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,
727 (2d Cir. 1996».
78. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Con
stitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997) [hereinafter Burt,
The Supreme Court Speaks). Burt's observations about the importance of adequate
pain management formed the basis of a further development of the issue in a 1999
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Burt's analysis of Glucksberg and Quill concluded that "[a] Court
majority effectively required all states to ensure that their laws do
not obstruct the provision of adequate palliative care, especially for
the alleviation of pain and other physical symptoms of people fac
ing death."79 Burt's analysis of the opinions of Justices O'Connor,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter demonstrates that these Jus
tices shared a sympathy for the plight of the many severely ill peo
ple not on life support who might have sought a physician's
assistance in making their deaths more dignified had New York and
Washington State not criminalized physician-assisted suicide. None
of the Justices were prepared to find in the Constitution a right to
physician-assisted suicide, but they were plainly concerned about
whether any state's law unjustifiably aggravated the conditions of
dying in America. Accordingly, the Justices provided a number of
significant indications that state action that hinders the provision of
adequate pain relief might constitute a fact pattern that would
prompt the Court to announce a right to palliative care. Justice
Breyer put it this way:
[A]s Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force
a dying person to undergo that kind of pain.... Rather, the laws
of New York and of Washington do not prohibit doctors from
providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite
the risk that those drugs themselves will kill. . . . Were the legal
circumstances different-for example, were state law to prevent
the provision of palliative care, including the administration of
article by Charles Wilson. Charles Wilson, Establishing a Right to Palliative Care at the
End of Life: The Litigation Alternative, 2 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 15 (1999). Wilson's arti
cle focuses on problems of pain management attributable to state medical boards, inad
equate medical education and "the attitudes of those involved in the dying process."
Id. at 18; see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom:
From Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco-A Brief History and Analysis of
Constitutional Protection of the 'Right to Die', 278 JAMA 1523, 1523-28 (1997).
79. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 78, at 1234. The brief of the
United States Justice Department in Glucksberg, which supported the constitutionality
of New York's and Washington State's statutes criminalizing physician-assisted suicide,
nevertheless argued that depriving a person of humane treatment implicates a signifi
cant liberty interest. The Justice Department argued that
[t]he term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause, however, is broad enough to
encompass an interest on the part of terminally ill, mentally competent adults
in obtaining relief from the kind of suffering experienced by the plaintiffs in
this case, which includes not only severe physical pain, but also the despair and
distress that comes from physical deterioration and the inability to control ba
sic bodily and mental functions.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185.
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drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life-then the law's
impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain
(accompanying death) would be more directly at issue. And as
Justice O'Connor suggests, the Court might have to revisit its
conclusions in these cases. 80
It is significant that in describing the problem of adequate pain

management, Justices Breyer and O'Connor suggested that a state
might not constitutionally be able to prevent doctors from provid
ing even that pain control that might carry with it "the risk that
those drugs themselves will ki11."81 It is frequently the case that for
those dying persons in severe or intractable pain, a medication
given to reduce the pain to tolerable levels could have the secon
dary effect of hastening death. The real differences between that
form of palliative care and the provision of active physician assis
tance in hastening dying (such as that prohibited by the laws of New
York and Washington State) can be difficult to articulate and troub
ling to some lawmakers and physicians. 82
Justice Breyer's opinion on pain relief and on the rule of
double effect is all the more interesting in view of the facts and
theory of the Quill case. 83 Quill was an equal-protection case in
which the plaintiffs claimed that the State of New York had no con
stitutionally justifiable reason to treat two groups of virtually identi
cal, terminally ill patients in such different ways. In particular, the
plaintiffs claimed that New York law concerning the terminally ill
80. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 78, at 1235 (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 791-92 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring), decided with Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
81. [d. The issue of adequate pain management is both legal and medical. See,
e.g., Amy J. Di1cher, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don't: The Need for a Com
prehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 81 (2004); Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a
Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 495 (2003); Ben A. Rich, A Pre
scription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1 (2000); Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, Pain Relief,
Acceleration of Death, and Criminal Law, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107, 107-27
(1996).
82. The medical phenomenon is called the "rule of double effect." For a discus
sion of the problem as it relates to the practice of palliative care medicine, see Lewis
Cohen et aI., Accusations of Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIA.
TIVE MED. 1096, 1096-1104 (2005). Another form of relief for severe pain and agita
tion, terminal sedation, also blurs the line between palliative care and physician-assisted
suicide, and it also troubles some physicians and policy makers. See, e.g., David Oren
tlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embrac
ing Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947 (1997).
83. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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was arbitrary and irrational. New York permitted competent, ter
minally ill patients on life support to have the assistance of a physi
cian in hastening death by withdrawing that life support and by
providing the pain relief and other palliative care that is often a
necessary part of easing the pain associated with the death that re
sults from such withdrawal. At the same time, according to the
plaintiffs, New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide prohibited
those patients who were equally terminally ill, equally in pain, and
equally competent-but who do not happen to require or receive
life support-from receiving a physician's assistance in hastening
death through the prescription of self-administered lethal medica
tion. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Second Cir
cuit and found that New York's classification of these two groups of
terminally ill persons was constitutionally justified.
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that some termi
nally ill people-those who are on life support-systems-are
treated differently than those who are not, in that the former may
"hasten death" by ending treatment, but the latter may not
"hasten death" through physician assisted suicide. This conclu
sion depends on the submission that ending or refusing lifesaving
medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than assisted sui
cide." Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction be
tween assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment,
a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical pro
fession and in our legal traditions, is both important and logical;
it is certainly rational. The distinction comports with fundamen
tal legal principles of causation and intent. 84

The Court provides a lengthy analysis of the two distinctions
causation and intent-that it says underlie the reasonableness of
how New York law treats the terminally ill. These arguments do
seem reasonable when one defines the problem as one of distin
guishing between refusing life-sustaining treatment on the one hand
and requesting a physician'S assistance in committing suicide on the
other. 85 The Quill Court was thus able to ground these distinctions
84. Id. at 800 (citations omitted).
85. In defending the distinction, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out that, "New
York has acted several times to protect patients' common law right to refuse treat
ment." Id. at 806. But several states are now considering legislation that would declare
that, contrary to the holding in Cruzan. the provision of artificial feeding and hydration
is not medical treatment and therefore cannot be the subject of a right to refuse treat
ment. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. The weakness of this reassurance
about the protections at stake here points up the importance of finding a fundamental
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in the state's legitimate interests as discussed in Glucksberg and
Cruzan:
By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment
while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law
follows a longstanding and rational distinction. New York's rea
sons for recognizing and acting on this distinction-including
prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; preventing sui
cide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; pro
tecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and
psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoid
ing a possible slide towards euthanasia .... 86
Based on the interest in preventing suicide, the Chief Justice's
opinion attempted to use the "intent" distinction to show that a
doctor who prescribes self-administered barbiturates to a pain-rid
den, terminally ill patient is intending something very different
from that which is intended by a doctor who prescribes large doses
of morphine to a pain-ridden, terminally ill patient whose life sup
port has just been removed.87 But when one considers the actual
circumstances of the many terminally ill, competent persons who
are in great pain but cannot hasten death by refusing or withdraw
ing life support, the problem gets more complex. The Court's cau
sation and intent distinctions seem both less helpful and less
grounded in the realities of dying in America when one considers
the ambiguous nature of physicians' and patients' options in end-of
life situations. This is where Justice Breyer's concern that no state
should prevent physicians from providing adequate pain relief
even if that assistance actively hastens death-becomes significant.
Justice Breyer and the other Justices whose opinions form the basis

constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and to receive adequate palliative
care.
86. Quill, 521 U.S. at 808. The Court's statement about permitting everyone to
hasten death by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment (when so many terminally ill
persons do not have this option because they are not on life support) not only begs the
question of the Quill case, but it also reads like Anatole France's famous line, "[T]hey
must labour in the face of the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor
alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." ANATOLE
FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (Modern Library ed., 1917) (1894).
87. As the Chief Justice put it, "[T]he law distinguishes actions taken 'because of'
a given end from actions taken 'in spite of' their unintended but foreseen conse
quences." Quill, 521 U.S. at 802-03 (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir.
1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting».
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of Professor Burt's analysis have found the reality-based grey area
in the bright-line legal distinctions that Rehnquist has drawn. 88
The problem with the Chief Justice's opinion in Quill is that it
seems to permit the states to criminalize some forms of end-of-life
care on the basis of distinctions of physician intent and medical cau
sation that do not respect or reflect the realities confronted by dy
ing patients, their families, and physicians. Rehnquist's analysis
thereby unduly burdens the privacy and the flexibility of the doctor
patient-family relationship.89 The potential benefit of Justice
Breyer's opinion is that it acknowledges these realities and leaves
open the possibility that a right to palliative care may eventually
occupy the grey area that the Chief Justice's opinion insists is either
black or white. The fact that Justice Breyer and others on the
Court have been willing to recognize the realities of pain manage
ment and of end-of-life care reinforces the view that there may be
ways to ensure that states do not interfere unreasonably with the
provision of palliative care and with the concomitant right to refuse
medical treatment. Professor Burt concludes his analysis by observ
ing that
[l]aws restricting the appropriate availability of drugs are,
moreover, not the only aspect of state actions that obstruct ade
quate palliative care. As the Institute of Medicine report found,
there are other obstructions, such as "mechanisms for financing
care [that] impede good end-of-life care ...." If state legisla
tures refused to address such obstructive elements of their laws,
or gave them only perfunctory attention, they would be guilty (in
Justice Souter's words) of "legislative foot-dragging," .... Such
88. There is no need to deny the real differences (between permitting the refusal
of life-sustaining medical treatment and legalizing physician-assisted suicide) in arguing
that there is a grey area in which the Court's distinctions do not in fact constitute real
differences. The problem is difficult for physicians and for medical ethics as well. See
Cohen et aI., supra note 82. It is a problem of the relationship of doctor, patient, and
family in each unique situation, not a problem of public policy. An interesting and
provocative reflection on the limits of legal rule-making and the benefits of common
law decision-making in this area can be found in the book Limits: The Role of Law in
Bioethical Decision Making. ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING (1996).
89. The burden is "undue" because there are other ways to prevent abuses in the
provision of adequate pain relief or terminal sedation. Oregon's experience seems to
indicate that careful regulation, respectful of patient-doctor privacy, can keep even phy
sician-assisted suicide from becoming abusive-see Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
and the reports of its use since it took effect. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (West 2006);
see, e.g., OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/
docs/year8.pdf.

338

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:309

states would (in Justice Breyer's words) "infringe directly upon
... the core of the interest in dying with dignity," which involves
"medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe
physical suffering."90

It is more than simply ironic that such perceptions about the
realities of end-of-life care, and about the nature of the liberty
rights that are therein implicated, should be met over the decade
since Glucksberg and Quill with a wholesale attack upon both the
right to refuse medical treatment and the provision of adequate pal
liative care. 91 It may be that these attacks are a strategic political,
cultural, and legal response to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Quill. Per
haps because these cases provide only tenuous protections for con
stitutional rights of autonomy for the terminally ill, they present
weaknesses that the opponents of these principles may be able to
exploit. And perhaps because these cases also suggest that patients,
families, and physicians might require constitutional protections in
end-of-life decision-making, the opponents of autonomy may feel
compelled to undercut the medical, ethical, and legal consensus
about end-of-life care that has existed for over twenty-five years.

IV.

THE ArrACK ON THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT AND
ON THE PROVISION OF PALLIATIVE CARE

There are four main areas in which political, legal, or ideologi
cal action threatens to undermine the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment and the provision of adequate palliative care.
These are: (A) proposals of state laws that restrict the right to re
fuse treatment, (B) federal attempts to supplant state and profes
sional judgments about what constitutes good medical practice, (C)
criminal or professional charges brought against physicians and
nurses engaged in palliative care, and (D) attempts to undermine
the autonomy principle in end-of-life care.
In each of these areas, the effort is to influence or create gov
ernment policies such that they enact the preferences of one view of
end-of-life care-or of life itself-to the exclusion of virtually all
others. No doubt many of these efforts are well-intentioned and
accord with the beliefs of their proponents. One can be equally
90. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 78, at 1236 (citations omitted)
(quoting INST. OF MED., COMM. ON CARE AT TIlE END OF LIFE, ApPROACHING DEATII:
IMPROVING CARE AT TIlE END OF LIFE Recommendation 3(6) (1997); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 788, 792 (1997)).
91. At the same time, there has been a high-level effort to upend the one state
law that legalizes and regulates physician-assisted suicide. See infra Part IV.
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confident that at least at the political level, many of these efforts
are engaged in with a blind certainty unconcerned about the com
plex realities faced by millions of American families. One result
has been an increasing polarization, both of the public discourse
and of end-of-life issues themselves. Another has been the weaken
ing of the legal protections for the rights that most Americans have
come to expect as part of the decades-old consensus about individ
ual decision-making in medical care. Still another has been the
politicizing of the doctor-patient relationship and the practice of
medicine itself. It is not necessary to discredit the proponents' mo
tives in order to see how destructive these actions are in their ef
fects. At the close of his dissent in Cruzan, Justice Brennan
recalled this principle as articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis: "Ex
perience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well meaning but without understanding. "92
A.

Proposing State Laws that Restrict the Right to Refuse
Treatment

The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) has drafted a
bill entitled "Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with
Disabilities Prevention Act,"93 that would prohibit any surrogate,
guardian, public agency, or court from discontinuing artificial nutri
tion and hydration for a non-competent medical patient except, "If
the person executed a directive in accordance with [state advance
directive statute] specifically authorizing the withholding or with
drawal of nutrition and/or hydration, to the extent the authorization
applies. "94 In addition to establishing a presumption against a ter
mination of this form of life support for the 80 percent of Ameri
cans who do not have advance directives, the bill empowers states
to completely outlaw the termination of artificial feeding and hydra
tion by adopting laws such as Missouri's that prevent advance direc
92. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent
ing) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ).
93. NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2006), available at http://www.nrlc.orgleuthanasia/
MODELN&HStateLaw.pdf [hereinafter MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT].
94. Id. § 4B. Section 4A also provides an exception if the feeding and hydration
would not sustain life or would cause discomfort to the patient.
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tives from controlling such termination. 95 The model bill also
empowers a wide range of persons (including certain public offi
cials, many relatives, and even a patient's former healthcare provid
ers) to bring a civil action for an injunction preventing the removal
of this form of life support,
against any person who is reasonably believed to be about to vio
late or who is in the course of violating this act, or to secure a
court determination, notwithstanding the position of a guardian
or surrogate, whether there is clear and convincing evidence that
the person legally incapable of making health care decisions,
when legally capable of making such decisions, gave express and
informed consent to withdrawing or withholding hydration or nu
trition ....96

During the pendency of such a civil suit, the model bill would re
quire that the court direct that the artificial feeding and hydration
be maintained. The effect of adopting this model bill could be to
nearly completely block the termination of this form of life support.
If such a bill affecting artificial feeding and hydration can pass and
be found not to violate Cruzan,97 the door would be open to laws
preventing the refusal of other life-sustaining medical treatments.
The drafting and publication of the NRLC Model Act,
amended in January 2006, has not been an academic exercise.
Twenty-three states have seen bills based on or similar to the
NRLC Model Act introduced as of February 2006. 98 Many of these
have languished in committee or been rejected, but the effort to
95. See supra note 20.
96. MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES Aer,
supra note 93, § SA.
97. There is the general problem of the weakness of Cruzan's constitutional hold
ing. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Cruzan specifically finds that,
and explains why, artificial feeding and hydration was held to be medical treatment.
The State's artificial provision of nutrition and hydration implicates identical
concerns. Artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms
of medical treatment. Whether or not the techniques used to pass food and
water into the patient's alimentary tract are termed "medical treatment," it is
clear they all involve some degree of intrusion and restraint.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Medicalorgani
zations seem to agree, but some religious organizations and leaders, including the Pope,
have declared that artificial feeding and hydration cannot be considered medical
treatment.
98. MERGERWATCH, FAer SHEET: How RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES ARE TRY
ING TO LEGISLATE AWAY YOUR END-OF-LIFE CHOICES 1 (2006), available at http://
mergerwatch.orglpdfs/fs_eoUegislation.pdf; see also Compassion & Choices, Improv
ing Laws: In Legislatures, http://www.compassionandchoices.orglimprovinglaws/state
houses.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) (listing legislative efforts in various states).
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have them adopted has not waned. Three states-New York, Kan
sas, and Wisconsin-have considered even more restrictive end-of
life care bills that would be particularly threatening to the right to
refuse treatment. While none of these has succeeded, aspects of
their contents serve to illustrate the intensity of some special inter
est group opposition to the right to refuse treatment.
In New York, Assembly Bill 7911, introduced in May of 2005,
would have required "trial by jury for decisions by a health care
agent that would result in the death of an individual" except where
a valid, written living will was in existence. 99 The standard of proof
in the required jury trial would have been "clear and convincing
evidence. "100 The bill was referred to the Committee on Health
and apparently died there. lOl But the idea of submitting decisions,
such as those made by the Cruzan family, to a public trial by jury
would increase, unconscionably, the delays and suffering endured
by families and patients, and would turn a family tragedy into even
more of a media platform for the culture wars.102
In Kansas, House Bill 2307 was introduced in February of
2005. 103 An extensive revision of the state's law regarding the pow
ers and obligations of guardians, the proposal would have denied a
guardian the power, inter alia, to consent on behalf of the ward "to
the withholding or withdrawal of life-saving or life-sustaining medi
cal care, treatment, services or procedures" except "when the
guardian can prove beyond a reasonable doubt the ward's intent,
after full informed consent, to withhold or withdraw" such care at a
jury trial. l04 Justice Brennan pointed out the asymmetrical nature
of Missouri's "clear and convincing evidence" rule of decision in
99. A. 7911, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), available at 2005 N.Y. A.B. 7911
(Lexis).
100. Id.
101. See COMPASSION & CHOICES, COMPASSION CHOICES (2005), http://www.
compassionandchoices.org/pdfs/HealthCare_Restrictions.pdf. The information for this
contention has been supplemented for New York by the author. Telephone Interview
with a member of the Public Information Office of the New York State Legislature, in
Albany, N.Y. (Sept. 6, 2006).
102. A set of standards for termination of artificial feeding and hydration in New
York is now contained in the text of A. 5406-B, the Health Care Decision Act (HCDA)
that has been under consideration for several years in the New York legislature. A.
5406-B 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/
?bn=A05406&sh=t.
103. H.B. 2307, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005), available at http://www.
kslegisla ture .orglbills/2006/2307 .pdf.
104. Id.
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Cruzan.1°5 But by requiring that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
be provided at a jury trial, the Kansas proposal was so much more
lopsided than Cruzan that it amounted to a virtual ban on the use
of advance directives of any kind to carry out the will of a patient
expressed when he or she was competent. This bill died in the Judi
ciary Committee, but it expresses a common insistence on virtual
certainty in an area that is by its very nature characterized by am
bivalence, ambiguity, emotional conflict, and spiritual searching. 106
In Wisconsin, Assembly Bill 207 would have expanded the cir
cumstances in which a healthcare provider would be protected
against "employment discrimination" or any other legal conse
quences for refusing on grounds of "religious or moral belief or
conscience" to participate in "[i]ntentionally causing the death of
an individual who is not in a terminal condition, as defined in
§ 154.01(8), by withholding or withdrawing nutrition or hydration,"
or "[a]n act that intentionally causes or assists in causing the death
of an individual by assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing."lo7
The bill, which would have virtually eliminated the right to refuse
treatment and the provision of palliative care by making every
healthcare worker the personal arbiter of a patient's medical treat
ment, passed in the Wisconsin legislature and was sent to the Gov
ernor in October 2005. Governor James Doyle vetoed Assembly
Bill 207, saying,
This bill lets your doctor put his or her political beliefs ahead of
your medical best interests. That is simply unconscionable.
Medical decisions should be made by the patient and the doctor
based on what's best for the patient, not on the doctor's political
105. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
106. In an article seeking to justify congressional intervention in the Schiavo case,
Steven Calabresi made the argument that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
should be used in any case involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment:
Cruzan's holding that Missouri was within its rights to require clear and con
vincing evidence before an incompetent's hydration and nutrition is with
drawn, in a case where clear and convincing evidence of a desire to die was not
found, does not establish that the clear and convincing evidence standard is
the right standard to use in these sorts of cases. We are dealing here with
court orders that many Americans believe involve the ending of life. Ordina
rily, in end-of-life cases such as those involving heinous murderers convicted
of heinous crimes, we demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt before life
may be ended ....
Calabresi, supra note 58, at 165.
107. A.B. 207, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005), available at http://
www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/datalAB-207. pdf.
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views.... This bill doesn't even require health care providers to
give you a referral to someone else if they object to a particular
treatment. ...
Because it puts a doctor's political views ahead of the best
interests of patients, this bill ought to be called the "unconscion
able clause."108

B.

FederaL Attempts to SuppLant State and ProfessionaL
Judgments about What Constitutes Good MedicaL
Practice

Beginning in 1997, the federal government made several at
tempts to use the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)109 to overturn
Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law, which had twice been ap
proved by the voters of Oregon and which remained free of consti
tutional condemnation as anticipated by the Court's ruling in
GLucksberg. 110 The method chosen to overturn the Oregon law
each time, however, involved casting a chill over the practice of pal
liative care medicine (and therefore also over the right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment) throughout the nation. In 1997,
certain members of Congress requested that Attorney General Ja
net Reno use her powers under the CSA to revoke the license to
prescribe Schedule II opiates of any physician assisting suicide,
even under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.1 11 Attorney Gen
eral Reno concluded that the CSA did not grant her that power,
and in 1998, and again in 1999, legislation was introduced in Con
gress that would have granted the Attorney General the power to
make judgments about the intent of doctors prescribing Schedule II
drugs. The 1998 proposal, House Bill 4006,112 was entitled the "Le
thal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998." The 1999 version of the
108. Executive Vetoes of Bills Passed by the 2005 Wisconsin Legislature from Janu
ary 3, 2005 to May 30, 2006 (Brief 06-9), WIS. BRIEFS (Wis. Leg. Reference Bureau,
Madison, Wis.), May 2006, at 21, available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/LRB/pubs/wb/
06wb9.pdf.
109. 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-971 (2000).
110. "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Washing
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
111. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (2005); see also Gonzales v. Oregon 126 S.
Ct. 904, 913 (2006).
112. H.R. 4006, 105th Congo (1998).
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same proposal, HR 2260,113 was entitled the "Pain Relief Promo
tion Act of 1999." Neither passed, and in November 2001, Attor
ney General John Ashcroft issued an Interpretive Rule that stated,
[A]ssisting suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" within
the meaning of 21 c.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001), and ... prescribing,
dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to
assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances Act. Such con
duct by a physician registered to dispense controlled substances
may "render his registration ... inconsistent with the public in
terest," and therefore subject to possible suspension or revoca
tion under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).114
By issuing such a broad rule, the Attorney General was not
only claiming the power under the CSA to judge the intentions of
physicians in Oregon who might be working within the regulations
imposed by the state's Death with Dignity Act,11S he was also open
ing the possibility that the Drug Enforcement Agency could investi
gate the intentions of any doctor in the nation who prescribed
Schedule II medications for pain management.1 16 The State of Ore
gon challenged this assertion of federal power over its regulation of
the practice of medicine, arguing that the CSA did not give the At
torney General the power he claimed. In hearing the case of Ore
gon v. AshcroJt,117 the federal district court considered numerous
amicus briefs from medical organizations, ethicists, and professors
arguing that the rule would have a chilling effect nationally. One
brief, filed by a "Group of Physicians, Attorneys, and Professors
Working in Medical Ethics," on the appeal to the Ninth Circuit
stated,
[M]any states now, by statute, permit doctors to prescribe seda
tion sufficient to ensure that a terminally ill patient does not feel
pain or experience suffering, even if there is a risk that enough
medication to quell the pain or suffering will also be lethal. The
expansive powers claimed by the Attorney General would permit
him to conclude that such uses of controlled substances are
113. H.R. 2260, 106th Congo (1999).
114. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607
(Interpretive Rule, Nov. 9, 2001).
115. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995.
116. See generally Timothy E. Quill & Diane E. Meier, The Big Chill-Inserting
the DEA into End-of-Life Care, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2006).
117. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002), affd sub nom.,
Gonzalez v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
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outside of "the course of professional practice" or do not serve a
"legitimate medical purpose," ....
Controlled substances are also commonly prescribed to re
lieve pain in terminally ill patients who have chosen to refuse
further life-sustaining care. If the Attorney General opposes
such a patient's right to refuse care, as his filing in the Schiavo
case suggests, he could effectively prevent the exercise of this
right by threatening to revoke the license of any physician pre
scribing controlled substances to ease the pain of a patient who
rejects further life-sustaining support.lls
The district court ruled against the Attorney General, and the
ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.1 19 In January 2006, the
Supreme Court affirmed 6-3 on the narrow ground that the CSA
did not give the U.S. Attorney General the power he had
claimed. 120 The Court did not directly address the contention of
several amici concerned about a national chilling effect on the prac
tice of palliative care medicine or on the right to refuse life-sus
taining medical treatment. Moreover, the Court did not use the
case as an opportunity to expand on the suggestions contained in
many of the Glucksberg opinions that any state action that unduly
burdened a terminally ill patient's right to get adequate pain relief
(such as that of Attorney General Ashcroft in 2001) might raise the
possibility of finding a constitutional right to palliative care. The
Court's only statement in this area was,
Under the Government's theory, moreover, the medical
judgments the Attorney General could make are not limited to
physician-assisted suicide. Were this argument accepted, he
could decide whether any particular drug may be used for any
particular purpose, or indeed whether a physician who adminis
ters any controversial treatment could be deregistered.1 21
Because the Court chose the statutory grounds for its ruling,
did not reinforce the constitutional right to refuse medical treat
ment, and did not even make reference to the constitutional conse
quences of federal or state actions that deny access to palliative
care, it left open the possibility of amending the CSA, as had been
tried in 1998 and 1999. On August 3, 2006, Senator Sam Brown
118. Brief for Margaret P. Battin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon
dents, at 25-26, Gonzales v. Oregon, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-623) (cita
tions omitted), available at http://www.cfidc.orgllegal/or.pdf.
119. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
120. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 904.
121. Id. at 921.
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back of Kansas introduced the Assisted Suicide Prevention Act of
2006 to do just that.1 22 The bill acknowledged that "[ a]lleviating
pain or discomfort in the usual course of professional practice is a
legitimate medical purpose for the dispensing, distributing, or ad
ministering of a controlled substance that is consistent with public
health and safety, even if the use of such substance may increase
the risk of death."123 But it also empowers the Attorney General to
prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the prac
titioner was to dispense, distribute, or administer a controlled sub
stance for the purpose of assisting suicide or causing the death of a
person. "124 Thus the weakness of Cruzan's constitutional holding
and the failure of the Court in Glucksberg, Quill, and Oregon v.
Gonzales to strengthen the autonomy principle in medical care has
left open yet another front for the continuing attack on the right to
refuse treatment and on the provision of palliative care.
C.

Criminal or Professional Charges Brought Against Physicians
and Nurses Engaged in Palliative Care

In a 1998 article, Criminal Act or Palliative Care: Prosecutions
Involving the Care of the Dying, it was reported that a search of
national databases uncovered a very small number of indictments
of physicians for homicide in connection with providing end-of-life
care. 125 The number of such indictments over a fifty-five year pe
riod from 1935 to 1990 was ten; but the pace increased considerably
in the seven years between 1990 and 1997, when there were seven
indictments. 126 Still, the small absolute number seems inconsistent
with the anecdotal reports of several physicians and medical re
searchers, and even a small number of convictions could be having
a significant negative impact on the practice of palliative care
medicine. A study was therefore initiated in 2006 to determine not
only the current prevalence of prosecutions of doctors and nurses
engaged in palliative care of the terminally ill, but also the condi
122. S. 3788, 109th Congo (2006). On September 7, 2006, Senator Ron Wyden of
Oregon put a "hold" on the bill, an action that requires sixty Senators to agree to bring
it to a vote in the Senate. 152 CONGo REc. S8920 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Wyden).
123. S. 3788, § 3(2).
124. Id. § 4(i)(4).
125. Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care: Prosecutions Involving the Care
of the Dying, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308,311 (1998).
126. Id.
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tions that may have led to those prosecutions. 127 The results of the
study are at least a year away. But one example of such a case,
drawn from publicly available legal literature and media coverage,
illustrates how ideological and political attacks on end-of-life care
options can create an atmosphere in which healthcare providers are
at risk, constitutional rights to refuse treatment become ever more
tenuous, and the ability to get access to adequate palliative care is
reduced. At the core of all of these problems is the threat posed by
the growing politicization of health care to the privacy of the doctor
patient-family relationship and to the integrity of the medical
profession.
In January 1996, a Kansas physician, Dr. L. Stanley Naramore,
was convicted in a jury trial of the attempted murder of one of his
patients and of the malicious second-degree murder of another of
his patients in 1992,128 Dr. Naramore provided palliative care to
the first patient, who was suffering from end-stage cancer and was
in extreme pain. He had participated in the termination of resusci
tation efforts on the second, an actively dying patient. Dr.
Naramore was sentenced to serve five to twenty years in a maxi
mum security prison, and was paroled after serving six months.129
He lost his license to practice and his reputation; he could not main
tain his family or his finances, and he could find no job. In July
1998, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed both of Naramore's
convictions and took the very unusual step of totally exonerating
him by directing a verdict of acquittal. 130
A number of things about the events that led up to and fol
lowed the indictments remain unclear and were not dealt with by
the Kansas Court of Appeals. It appears that the family of the first
patient gave consent to the palliative treatment after a thorough
127. The study, funded by the Greenwall Foundation, is entitled End of Life
Care: Healthcare Professionals and Subject Deaths, and is described in an article by
Lewis Cohen et aI., in the Journal of Palliative Medicine, as being focused on
medical and nursing staff who have been targeted and exonerated. We believe
the prevalence of such allegations needs to be determined, a more complete
understanding of the medical, social, and legal circumstances surrounding ac
cusations should be reached, and the bioethical issues underlying end-of-Iife
care warrant further examination. We hope to discover whether there are spe
cific risk management strategies, public policies, or legal initiatives that can be
used to meet this challenge.
Cohen et aI., supra note 82, at 1102-03.
128. Kansas v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
129. Id. at 213.
130. The Kansas Supreme Court denied review. Kansas v. Naramore, 266 Kan.
1114 (1998).
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discussion with Dr. Naramore in the hospital chapel, but it also ap
pears that the son of the patient changed his mind after much of the
pain medication had been given.l31 There were some suggestions
that the hospital administrator had been hostile to the doctor and
had played some role in convincing the families to turn against
him.132 It is unclear why the local prosecutor went ahead with the
prosecutions without first exploring the standards of medical care
observed by Kansas physicians in similar cases. There were also
allegations of jury misconduct contained in Naramore's appeal, and
there was a claim that the trial judge should have granted a change
of venue from the very small Kansas town in which Naramore prac
ticed and from which the jurors were drawn.B 3 Neither of these
last two issues was reached by the Court of Appeals.
What does seem clear from the available facts is that the use of
the criminal process (in two medical cases involving the most com
plicated and emotionally difficult decisions that families and physi
cians ever have to make) is at least partially responsible for this
miscarriage of justice. Under these circumstances, an atmosphere
was created in which the jury was allowed to ignore accepted stan
dards of good medical practice and make the defendant a lightning
rod for the grief and anger that many people feel in the face of
death. Personal beliefs and ideologies appear to have taken prece
dence over careful consideration of the facts and application of le
gally appropriate standards of judgment.
There was voluminous expert testimony in the case. The Court
of Appeals had the benefit of several amicus briefs from physicians
and medical associations, and at trial three physicians testified for
the state and six for the defense. 134 The convictions were reversed,
and the acquittal ordered, on the basis of legal insufficiency of evi
dence (and with the implication that the defendant had been
railroaded) .135
We have made a thorough review of the record, which in
cludes a wealth of undisputed evidence and expert medical testi
mony. We find that no rational jury could find criminal intent
131. Naramore, 965 P.2d at 212, 215. A documentary about the case, hosted by
Bill Kurtis, was aired by the A&E Television Networks, and pointed to some of these
unresolved questions. American Justice: A Questionable Doctor (A&E television
broadcast Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter A Questionable Doctor].
132. A Questionable Doctor, supra note 131.
133. See Naramore, 965 P.2d at 224.
134. Id. at 219-21; see A Questionable Doctor, supra note 131.
135. Naramore, 965 P.2d at 224.
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and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record here.
When the issue is whether there is reasonable doubt, a jury is not
free to disbelieve undisputed facts. What occurred here is gener
ally known. The jury was not free to disbelieve that there was
substantial competent medical opinion in support of the proposi
tion that Dr. Naramore's actions were not only noncriminal, but
were medically appropriate.13 6
The court further hinted at the problem of politicizing health
care and the practice of medicine by observing that if it had upheld
a jury verdict based on ignoring an "authoritative medical consen
sus," it would have "criminalized malpractice and even the possibil
ity of malpractice. "137 In a dissent, the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals agreed that the verdicts should be reversed, but would
have sent the case back for retrial based on adequate instructions to
the jury. The dissent makes clear the role that the law ought to play
in protecting the provision of quality healthcare to individual pa
tients in a time of public passions and political machinations about
end-of-life care.
However, unlike the civil Pattern Jury Instructions provided
in medical and professional malpractice cases, there are no crimi
nal Pattern Jury Instructions relating to the medical and moral
responsibilities of care givers for the critically or terminally ill
patient, nor are there legislatively created screening panels. If
care givers are now to be faced with the specter of criminal pros
ecution in these kinds of cases, then the legislature may want to
consider requiring the appointment of panels similar to those
used for medical malpractice cases prior to the filing of criminal
charges.
. . . At the very least, in the present case, the jury should
have been instructed on the physician's duty and standard of care
when treating a terminal cancer patient for pain and the recog
nized standard of care and measures to be taken in attempting to
save a [dying] patient. . .. Since they were not so instructed, it is
impossible to determine whether the jury made an assessment of
Naramore's actions, taking into consideration his role as a
physician. 138
The case of Dr. Stan Naramore-like the attempt of Attorney
General Ashcroft to control the practice of medicine in the states,
and like the ongoing state efforts to restrict the right to refuse medi
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225 (Brazil, J., dissenting).
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cal treatment-illustrates how the natural anguish that accompa
nies the death of a loved one, and the unnatural pressures that are
sometimes brought to bear by interest groups bent on imposing
their own sincerely held morals on everyone, can cast a pall over
the practice of palliative medicine and hobble the end-of-life care
that we are all someday likely to need.
D.

Attempts to Undermine the Autonomy Principle in End-of
Life Care

In a 2005 report by the President's Council on Bioethics, the
following statement was made in a chapter entitled, The Limited
Wisdom of Advance Directives, as part of an argument that the au
tonomy principle should be restricted or abandoned in end-of-life
care:
Not only are living wills unlikely to achieve their own stated
goals, but those goals themselves are open to question. Living
wills make autonomy and self-determination the primary values
at a time of life when one is no longer autonomous or self-deter
mining, and when what one needs is loyal and loving care.139

The report goes on to praise the usefulness of proxy directives,
since proxies "serve the wise and helpful purpose" of providing care
and making medical decisions on the basis of the explicit instruc
tions they have been given. But the report concludes that one can
never know one's needs in advance and must therefore rely on deci
sions made at the time by loved ones. The report praises the direc
tive a patient might give a proxy and the role of the proxy as
caregiver and participant in making decisions for patients who have
become unable to make their own. But, unlike Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Cruzan, the report does not suggest that the health care
proxy's decisions, or those of another guardian or surrogate, should
be regarded as determinative. Justice O'Connor sees that it is lib
139. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING
IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 55 (2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/takin~
care/takin~care.pdf. This report was issued by President George w. Bush's Council in
September 2005. Not surprisingly, the Council has a strong conservative bent and
reaches conclusions about end-of-life care and reproductive freedoms very different
from its predecessor appointed by President Clinton. For a listing of President Bush's
2002 appointees, see Press Release, The White House, Designation and Appointments,
Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021108-6·
htmI.SeealsoCruzanv.Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 329-30 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Brennan's use in Cruzan of a report on a similar topic written by a
prior President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
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erty at stake: "[T]he Court does not today decide the issue whether
a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate deci
sionmaker. ... In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally
required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment. "140
In effect, if not in intent, the President's Council report lays a
philosophical and policy foundation for diminishing the constitu
tional importance of the liberty interest that the Cruzan Court was
at least reluctantly willing to articulate. In doing this, the report
relies heavily on an article published in 2004 by the Hastings
Center, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will.141 The Hastings
article takes, among others, an economic view of the value of indi
vidual liberty in end-of-life care decisions. The authors claim that
"[i]n an attempt to extend patients' exercise of autonomy beyond
their span of competence, resources have been lavished to make
living wills routine and even universal. This policy has not pro
duced results that recompense its costs, and it should therefore be
renounced. "142
There are, of course, practical problems with advance direc
tives just as there are problems with medical decisions made for
those who come to the last stages of their lives without having left
any instructions or appointed any proxies to carry out their treat
ment wishes and look after their welfare. One of these problems,
referred to in both the President's Council report and the Hastings
article, is that only about 20 percent of Americans execute advance
directives of any sort.1 43 Some commentators have lamented the
low rate of adopting advance directives and the psychological and
philosophical dilemmas of a competent person's deciding what he
or she will value when no longer competent. These problems are
140. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, l., concurring).
141. Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living
Will, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30, 31, available at http://www.
thehastingscenter.org/pdf/publications/Hcr_Mar_Apr_2004_Enough.pdf.
142. Id. at 31.
143. The well-known SUPPORT study provided resources that might have in
creased the percentage of people with advance directives, but to no avail. A Controlled
Trial to Improve Care for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand
Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274
lAMA 1591, 1591 (1995); see also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note
139, at 55 (concluding that advance directives will not solve societal problems related to
care decisions because only a minority of Americans create them); Fagerlin & Schnei
der, supra note 141, at 32 (noting that "without considerable intervention approxi
mately 20 percent" of people complete living wills).
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then cited to justify declaring not only advance directives but also
the autonomy principle itself to be on life support.
In a 1998 book, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors,
and Medical Decisions,144 law professor and physician Carl Schnei
der suggests that the autonomy principle at the end of life is an
empirically ineffective expression of hyper-rationalism. Schneider
argues that the evidence of actual end-of-life decision-making
points to the fact that in many circumstances physicians are likely to
make better decisions than severely ill patients who want only to be
taken care of competently. But in a review of the book, Professor
George Annas takes issue with Schneider's assessment of how to
approach the role of autonomy:
I am with those who believe, unlike Schneider, that patients con
tinue to have too little, not too much, autonomy .... I agree ...
that more is at stake than just autonomy and that many choices
patients have are illusory and hollow. The central question is not
whether patient autonomy should be taken seriously: liberty is a
basic human right and is nowhere potentially more compromised
than when we are sick. The question is how we can build a medi
cal care system that routinely respects human rights and human
dignity as the fundamental constituents of life.1 45

The consequences of the medical and legal debate over auton
omy are far-reaching. In an article entitled The End of Autonomy,
Professor Robert Burt concludes that the difficulty of being rational
about what is essentially irrational (one's own death), and the im
portance (to patients, families, physicians, and public policy) of
maintaining an ambivalent attitude about end-of-life decisions, both
support the policy conclusion that an entirely new path should be
chosen for regUlating end-of-life decisions.
Death is more than a future condition with uncertain benefits
and detriments. It is more than the absence of life. It is the ab
sence, the intrinsic contradiction, of meaningfulness. The very
concept of the choice-making self, the construct on which the au
tonomy principle depends for its coherence, is radically unset

144.
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Book Review, 283 lAMA 930, 930-31 (2000)
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tied-even made incomprehensible-by the actual, imminent
approach of death.146

The President's Council report and the other policy and schol
arly explorations raise interesting philosophical issues and policy
problems, but viewed in the context of current law and of political
struggle over end-of-life care, they are very problematic. To say,
for example, that living wills or other explicit advance directives
lack validity because they are used when a person is no longer au
tonomous is to deny, in effect, the personhood of the maker of the
living will. The whole idea of an advance directive is to preserve
one's dignity, one's values, and one's liberty into a time when they
are dwindling-to use one's capacities while they are fully func
tional to plan for a time when they are not. There are, of course,
many changes of mind, unforeseeable circumstances, and new de
velopments that might influence how an advance directive would be
used or how a surrogate might evaluate a patient's previous expres
sions of will. But the difficulty of so doing is part of the human
condition, part of the mystery and the anguish of end-of-life deci
sion-making. These realities cannot be banished by any formula for
care of the terminally ill or any regime of decision-making about
dying; and the attempt to do so can only reduce the personhood,147
which advance directives in particular, and the autonomy principle
in general, are meant to preserve.
There are two other basic problems with these subtle and not
so-subtle attacks on the autonomy principle. First, one has to con
sider the alternatives to the present tenuous regime of constitu
tionallaw. The President's Council report, for example, praises the
role of family and of loved ones in making end-of-life decisions.
But the reality of healthcare politics-as illustrated by culture wars
fought over the right to refuse treatment-is that the state or some
146. Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, in HASTINGS ern., supra note 2, at
S9, S10. Burt offers three "countervailing schemes" for the social regulation of end-of
life care designed, he claims, to avoid the "malign dynamic" that prevails now and that
prevailed before the advent of the autonomy principle. Id. at SI1. For another deeply
humane but equally dark discussion of the philosophical and psychological realities of
our ambivalence toward death, see ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH IS THAT MAN TAKING
NAMES: INTERSECTIONS OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, LAW AND CULTURE (2002). See also
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 351 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra
text accompanying note 42.
147. Justice Stevens' observation in Cruzan is apposite: "To deny the importance
of ... [what Nancy Cruzan loses by having medical treatment continued against her
wishes] is in effect to deny that Nancy Cruzan has interests at all, and thereby to deny
her personhood in the name of preserving the sanctity of her life." Cruzan, 497 U.S.
261, 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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interest group, and not the family, will wind up making these deci
sions. 148 To engage in philosophical debates about the nature of
personhood, or the question of "whether the experience of old age
with dementia will still seem valuable to a future self"149 may mask
the struggle or it may provide a comfortable haven for speculation
about the mysteries of life; but it cannot stop the politicizing effect
of the culture wars upon end-of-life care. The realities of law and
politics explored in this Article suggest, moreover, that de-legitimiz
ing the autonomy principle may be the last action needed to under
mine the medical, ethical, and legal consensus on individual liberty
in decision-making about end-of-life care. 150
The other basic problem with the attack on the autonomy prin
ciple is that much of this discussion is so profound. At the discus
sion's core are questions about the meaning of life, death, and the
nature of the Self. It is a discussion fundamental to the ways in
which we understand our world and define our relationships to each
other, to the state and to the spiritual plane of existence. Differ
ences of belief and of opinion about these elements of the human
condition are matters of conscience. As such, they are as important
a part of individual liberty and as much deserving of constitutional
protection as are the freedoms of religion enumerated in the First
Amendment. It is precisely the power and depth of these compet
ing ideas-and the conflict that inevitably ensues when government
takes sides in the competition-that should convince us that the au
tonomy principle is not simply useful in end-of-life care decision
making, it is essential. Justice Stevens put the matter clearly in his
dissent in Cruzan.
148. As Justice O'Connor put it, "At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
149. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 139, at 83.
150. The philosophical debate is an interesting exploration of difficult problems
of end-of-Iife care decision-making. It is easy to lose sight in these discussions of the
fact that the United States Constitution is based upon philosophical decisions and polit
ical theory that are grounded in the Enlightenment. It is possible that the debate over
end-of-life issues may become not only a means to undermine the consensus on patient
autonomy in medical care decisions, but a threat to the basis of other individual liber
ties as well. To explore some of the philosophical debate, see Michael Quante, Prece
dent Autonomy and Persona/Identity, 9 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 365 (1999); Rebecca
Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 32, 32-38; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGU
MENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993).
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Our duty, and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with
the conditions of our own mortality ... are essential incidents of
the unalienable rights to life and liberty endowed us by our Crea
tor.... [N]ot much may be said with confidence about death
unless it is said from faith, and that alone is reason enough to
protect the freedom to conform choices about death to individual
conscience. We may also, however, justly assume that death is
not life's simple opposite, or its necessary terminus, but rather its
completion. Our ethical tradition has long regarded an apprecia
tion of mortality as essential to understanding life's significance.
It may, in fact, be impossible to live for anything without being
prepared to die for something. 151
CONCLUSION

This review of the Supreme Court cases and of some of the
political controversies involving the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment and the provision of palliative care suggests that
the constitutional rights and the autonomy principle at stake are
tenuous, perhaps even unreliable. It also suggests that the ideologi
cal and cultural attacks upon these rights are becoming strong, even
virulent. The effect has been the politicization of end-of-life health
care in general, and an undermining of doctor, patient, and family
privacy and of the integrity of the medical profession in particular.
This last-the politicization of medical practice and of the relation
ship of doctors to their patients and their families-is a great irony.
For among the state interests that the Court has found to be legiti
mate and important is not only the protection of life but also the
ethical integrity of the medical profession, with all that implies not
only about easing suffering but also about maintaining the trust and
privacy central to the doctor-patient relationship.1 52
At the same time, there are hopeful signs for the maintenance
and enhancement of the quality and dignity of medical care for the
terminally ill. Several Justices of the Court have written opinions
that indicate not only that they understand and empathize with the
151. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997). This state interest in
cludes the idea that the state should protect medical ethics partly in order to secure the
conditions of trust between doctor and patient upon which the proper functioning of
the entire healthcare enterprise depends. To politicize the relationship between pa
tients and their doctors is hardly to support the trust upon which good decision-making
by them depends. It appears, then, that in some cases the state has been using one
legitimate interest-the protection of life-to undermine another legitimate state inter
est-the effectiveness and integrity of the medical profession.
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heartaches and struggles of families and patients faced with the
need for palliative care, but also that they see the logic of using the
liberty protections of the Constitution to secure individual auton
omy, family, patient, and physician privacy and the availability of
palliative care. Public opinion is clearly and overwhelmingly op
posed to the meddling of government and of special interest groups
in the private dilemmas of families such as the Cruzans and the
Schiavos. The philosophers and advocates of medical paternalism
and of religious hegemony are still in the minority. There is poten
tial, therefore, to extend the protections for, and resist the attacks
on, end-of-life care by working towards the creation of a compre
hensive right to palliative care for the terminally ill and for those
who refuse medical treatment.
The creation of a right to palliative care-which might be ar
ticulated judicially on the state or federal level or through legisla
tion at the state level-would be a complex matter. 153 Such a right
would have to be based on the evaluation of many questions about
end-of-life care and refusal of medical treatment like those raised
by the cases and controversies discussed in this Article. The pro
cess used for recommending the content of a right to palliative care
would have to be multi-disciplinary and apolitical,154 providing
ways to take into account the experiences of ordinary Americans
and the many forms of professional, academic, and policy expertise
already contained in the literature of medicine, social work, ethics,
and law. Most important, the work would have to be undertaken
by persons who understand that individual autonomy and doctor
patient privacy in making end-of-life decisions are fundamental
parts of liberty, and that this liberty must be secured against the
politicization and polarization that has characterized so many of the
battles in a growing culture war over death and dying in America.

153. See supra note 2 for an outline of some of the substantive issues about the
nature of palliative care that would have to be addressed. It might be said that the
evaluation of the law and politics of palliative care contained in this Article begins and
ends with an urgent call for the construction and adoption of a right to palliative care
for the terminally ill, but that it does not prescribe in detail what such a right should
contain.
154. Unfortunately, experience has shown that the President's Council on
Bioethics might not provide such an apolitical forum. See supra note 139.

